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The  implementation  of management  control  devices  in  the  public  sector  is  a  very 
difficult challenge, especially if these devices come from private sector. Through two case 
studies, this paper analyses how two public organizations have implemented management 
control  systems.  We  point  out  that  both  public  organizations  studied  have  developed  a 
complex set of practices around their management control systems. Despite some apparent 
failures,  the  implemented  systems  are  not  merely  myths  about  the  running  of  public 
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Introduction  
Since  the  seventies,  public  organizations  have  developed  management  control 
systems. Historically, these systems have been invented for private organizations (Levant, De 
La Villarmois, 2001). The rise of these accounting information systems can be dated to the 
beginning of the nineteenth  century. Private organizations  developed  management control 
system devices to measure their performance. But, in public organizations, these systems have 
a  different  role.  Historically,  the  semantics  of  the  term  ―accountability‖  (Mulgan,  2000) 
insisted on one essential aspect of the public management device: compliance with legal rules. 
Gradually,  a  new  objective  has  been  added  to  the  control  of  regularity:  to  assess  the 
effectiveness of the public management. However, traditional devices of public management 
have important limits which can prevent this goal. Demeestère (2002, 42-44) underlines the 
lack of information in public accounting and the imperfections of the budgetary system. Thus, 
public organizations need to create new tools to manage their activities or use traditional tools 
in a new way. Consequently, the process of instrumentation becomes an increasingly pressing 
need in public organizations. This movement, observed in many French public organizations 
(regional councils, hospitals, police, etc.), indicates important management changes in these 
organizations  but  also  the  difficulties  of  implanting  management  control  systems  in  this 
context. 
Even if the need to use management control systems in the private sector appeared a 
long  time  ago  (in  France,  the  Planning  Programming  Budgeting  System  dates  from  the 
seventies), it is today an important program for public organizations. Indeed, these systems 
can address such questions as: is the quality of the public service sufficient? Are the financial 
resources well used? Are the users of public services satisfied? Is the price of the service 
right? Thus, most of the reforms aim to increase the performance of the public organizations. 
New Public Management is the term for reforms undertaken by the public organizations since 
the eighties.  
However,  despite  the  number  of  reforms  adopted  in  the  name  of  New  Public 
Management, numerous authors also noted the relative failure of these reforms. To explain the 
difficulties related to the use of management control systems in public organizations, our 
research uses the theoretical framework proposed by neo-institutional theory. More precisely, 
in analysing two case studies carried out in French public organizations (Police and ADEME), 
our research addresses the questions: How can we assess the effects of management control 
devices  used  by  the  public  organizations?  Put  a  different  way:  we  ask  whether  the 
management control systems are only ineffective myths about public organizations, or if they 
may have unforeseen effects. 
In  the  first  part  of  this  paper,  we  develop  the  theoretical  approach.  After  the 
presentation of the principles and the stakes of New Public Management, the neo-institutional 
framework is developed to explain the relative failure of the public reforms. In the second 
part, we describe the methodology used for the two case studies. The third part presents the 
two case studies. The first case study describes the management tools used in the French 
National Police. The second case study analyses the process of creation of a management 
control system device in local communities. In the fourth part, the question of research is 
discussed. It seems difficult to label the management control systems device used by public 






































1  Rise and fall of NPM: explanation from theory 
New Public Management makes it possible to describe evolutions of public service but 
does not propose a framework of analysis. Also, to understand the role of the management 
control system in public organizations, the neo-institutional theory is mobilized. 
1.1  The  New  Public  Management:  a  way  to  modernize  the  public 
management? 
New Public Management is a topic which aroused debate in the nineties. This theme is 
still  an  important  object  of  reflections,  especially  in  the  international  community.  Many 
debates exist between the defenders of this approach, for whom the NPM symbolize the return 
of the public utility, and the opponents who only note the failures of these reforms. 
1.1.1  The NPM principles 
New Public Management finds its origin in the neo-liberal ideas of the seventies. The 
expression  became  established  only  in  the  nineties  to  indicate  a  set  of  similar  reforms 
concerning  public  organizations  (Merrien,  1999).  The  external  characteristics  of  public 
organizations and their recent evolutions led the organizations to set up many reforms. Which 
characteristics can we ascribe to New Public Management? In a general way, NPM describes 
a phenomenon that ranges from managerialism (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1993) to the full package 
of government reforms introduced since 1980 (OECD, 1995). Aucoin (1995) suggested that 
the NPM is a necessary reform because public management is overly preoccupied with rules 
and procedures. In his work on public management, Crozier (1997) characterizes NPM as 
starting from three elements: 
-  a process of automation of the organization opposite public authority 
-  a process of reconciliation of its users: It is a question of reducing the gap between the 
State and the citizen. Thus, public organizations must develop instruments to identify and 
meet the new needs for the users of public services. 
-  a process of transformation of the organization: changes of structure and of culture must 
be carried out. New contacts must appear between policy, the legal framework, citizens 
and the manager of public organizations. 
In most of these definitions, the concept of public performance appears. To Terry 
(1998) New Public Management is a global movement reflecting elements of both liberation 
management  and  market-driven  management.  The  liberation  management  school 
characterizes professional public managers caught in bad systems. They are ―overburdened by 
a plethora of cumbersome and unnecessary rules, regulations and other constraints‖ (Terry, 
1998) such as budgeting, personnel, and procurement systems which should be decentralized. 
Liberated  managers  would  be  held  accountable  to  the  democratic  process  by  what  they 
achieve in their respective policy areas. Hence the necessary control is exercised through 
outcome measures rather than through input constraints. Merriem (1999) insists on this last 
point.  He  gives  to  NPM  an  essential  characteristic:  to  reinforce  the  efficiency  of  public 
organizations activities. Glor (2001, 124-125) defines NPM in public organizations by the 
presence of three elements: introduction of private management devices, creation of market 
and creation of measurements of performance. In the same way, NPM management changes 
include three elements (Loeffler, 1997): 
-  Private sector management approaches were introduced in Canada, using concepts such as 
excellence, downsizing, re-engineering, corporate culture, total quality, value for money, 
results,  use  of  incentives,  performance  measurement,  customer  service  and  profit. 






































balanced  scorecard,  developed  in  the  private  sector  to  take  account  of  more  than  the 
financial bottom line, received attention (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). 
-  Market-type mechanisms were used. The federal government introduced internal markets, 
where departments sold services to each other. User fees were increased for services such 
as passports, parks and vehicle licences. Agencies were put on full cost recovery, such as 
printing shops and the employee assistance programme. SOAs created mini-enterprises and 
employee take-over of federal enterprises was encouraged. 
-  Performance  measurement  and  incentives  became  predominant  after  the  introduction  of 
business planning. Description of programmes and finances by department was replaced 
with results-focused business plans, performance frameworks and reports on plans.  
  NPM and public performance 
This rapid analysis of the definitions given to NPM indicates the importance of the 
management control system in the development of these reforms. Finally, NPM becomes a 
way to optimize the operation of public organizations without infringing on the public utility. 
This strategy of modernization is different from strategies of privatization currently observed 
within  the  French  public  organizations.  Thus,  NPM  seeks  to  transform  bureaucratic 
organizations into entrepreneurial organizations by introducing management control system 
devices. Public organizations will thus set up systems of control of the performance of their 
activities. The transparency of the public organizations is necessary: it makes it possible to 
support the effectiveness and the efficiency of their activities. In NPM, transparency is based 
on the results, measurements of these results and the reporting (Audria, 2004). The control of 
performance  holds  a  central  place  in  these  reforms.  Its  objective  is  essential  in  the 
modernization of the administration: the control and the monitoring of French administration 
activities. Consequently, this approach brings to mind public action in terms of effectiveness 
and efficiency: the control of public organizations is directed towards to the results. Thus, in 
many French and foreign administrations, the reforms are largely inspired by management 
control  devices  used  in  private  organizations  (for  example,  quality  circles,  search  for 
excellence, zero defect). In Great Britain, the first wave of reform had aimed to develop 
management by objectives, to set remuneration in advance according to performance and, 
finally, to set up a new budgetary technique for the total budget (Merrien, 1999). 
OECD  (2003)  defined  improving  performance  (and  especially  improving  cost 
effectiveness) and redefining the role of  the public sector in the economy as the primary 
thrusts of reform initiatives. For Aucoin (1995) NPM changes in public policy were a new 
paradigm of public management that included ―privatization‖ of public enterprises, increased 
contracting, expansion of user charges and expenditure restraint, including reducing the size 
of public service and public payroll. For OECD (2003), the reforms following NPM did not 
only have the objective of increasing the efficiency of public actions. It is indeed important to 
note that these reforms involved changing a serious perspective on the reflection on public 
administration. Thus, even if the results of NPM are contrasted, it is necessary to be aware of 
renewals precipitated by these reforms. The objective is not to change in record time but to 
manage and to modify the behaviour of public organizations for, in the future, enriching the 
public culture of these organizations by managing public performance.  
  The NPM limits 
This  period  of  reform  involved  changing  a  serious  and  long-held  perspective  on 
administration. The authorities opened their minds to new ideas on management. However, 
have these reforms achieved their goals? As we will show, the results are moderate. It would 






































not  guarantee  the  modernization  of  public  administrations  (OECD,  2003).  Three  critical 
points are formulated to the NPM reforms (Saint-Germain, 2001): 
-  It is possible to note that NPM is not easily applicable to the whole of the administration 
sectors. In the services where the process rests on human relations, the difficulties are 
major. Pollitt  (1995) underlines the difficulty of defining performance when there are 
many such interactions. Moreover, the multiplication of interactions can be an important 
factor in the interpretation of the indicators.  
-  We  should  not  underestimate  the  motivation  of  the  actors  of  the  public  organization. 
Actors have problems determining their missions and objectives, so management control 
systems could not be used optimally.  
-  Lastly,  development  of  external  services  is  likely  to  generate  the  development  of 
organizations based on their interests, thus forgetting the reasons for their existence and 
the needs of the users. They recreate what they fight: personal interest (Monks, 1998). The 
system of management control systems can split the administrative units, disuniting them 
from each other, and preventing a global vision of the State act (Urio, 1998). 
Authors  developed  strong  criticisms  of  the  reforms  of  New  Public  Management. 
Merrien (1999) views NPM as a myth. He tries to illustrate his remarks by proposing some 
examples of ―failures‖ of these reforms: the research of efficiency had perverse effects that 
were  not  anticipated  (like  the  loss  of  expertise  in  public  organizations).  Moreover,  the 
countries that launched these reforms are not really satisfied with them. For example, after ten 
years of reforms in Great Britain (1979-1986) the services of the State are not more effective.  
1.2  NPM as a myth: a new institutional sociology approach 
To better understand the relative failure of NPM, new institutional sociology, notably 
developed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Meyer and Rowan (1977), could be used. 
Management control systems (MCS) can be conceived as a rational myth. In use, roles of 
MCS can be decoupled from displayed roles. MCS devices are not be used only to increase 
efficiency of organizations but also to legitimate their actions. Such interpretation implies that 
we do not assess the success or failure of MCS devices only in terms of efficiency. 
  The new institutional sociology approach 
The new institutional sociology (NIS) approach analyses organizations as organized 
systems  running  within  social  structures  including  norms,  value  and  taken-for-granted 
hypotheses. Institutions define what we have to consider as a rational behaviour. To define 
institutions,  we  can  borrow  Scott’s  definition  (1995):  ―Institutions  consist  of  cognitive, 
normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social 
behaviour. Institutions are transported by various carriers — cultures, structures and routines 
— and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction.‖  
The agents’ rationality is not dependent only on either an economic calculus based on 
available information or on an adaptive behaviour. It is not only because of its economic 
rationality that a decision is made. Alternative inputs for decision making, social information, 
are taken into account to justify decisions. We will analyse these ―new‖ inputs, keeping in 
mind that they are not exclusively economic inputs. 
Finally, we could argue that NIS is interested in organizational conformity. According 
to Scott (1995): ―organizations … conform [to institutional pressures for change] because 
they  are  rewarded  for  doing  so  through  increased  legitimacy,  resources,  and  survival 
capabilities.‖ This theoretical framework can be used in different ways. NIS theories are thus 






































  Rational myths and ritualistic behaviours: the necessity to conform 
Institutions play a great role in the understanding of legitimacy of practices but also in 
the  explanation  of  some  apparent  discrepancies.  According  to  Meyer  and  Rowan  (1977), 
organizations  run  in  an  institutional  context,  which  gives  them  their  legitimacy  and 
probability of surviving if organizations conform. Products, services, techniques, politics and 
programs are strong myths that organizations adopt in ceremonial ways to show to others that 
they  conform  to  outside  institutions.  However,  this  conformity  can  be  irrelevant  to  the 
organization’s own efficiency. Indeed, there is no reason to think that institution conformity 
fits with higher efficiency. In some cases, institution conformity can also divert resources. 
According to Meyer and Rowan, companies use their formal structures to solve the 
dilemma of ceremonial activities and efficiency. Formal structures of companies reflect the 
myths  of  their  institutional  environment.  Companies  use  formal  structures  to  control  and 
coordinate their activities. But very often, these formal structures are not really in place to 
increase efficiency. Formal structures are very interesting in their role of sending messages to 
external environments to legitimate their actions. They give appearance of rationality. This 
legitimacy has different origins: public opinion, education, social prestige, law, etc. 
Numerous parts of the formal structure of companies are rational myths. These myths 
are responses in terms of legitimacy to a set of environmental demands. This implies that 
management devices are not necessarily used for their own qualities, which can allow better 
management. Sometimes they are symbols of good management practices and legitimate the 
practices of companies. These myths are rational because they give the appearance of strong 
rationality and can be used as a justification of companies’ existence. Agents justify their 
practices in terms of efficiency improvements through myths, but their actual role is more 
symbolic. Symbolic roles are more important than functional roles. Economic rationality is 
only superficial. 
Relating to our research, one question can be asked: are MCS devices rational myths? 
The answers to this question could explain the apparent lack of success of NPM and allow us 
to go further. 
  Methodology 
Two  case  studies  are  used  to  illustrate  how  management  and  accounting  control 
systems operate in French administration. They give us the opportunity to better understand 
problems  raised  by  MCS  in  such  a  public  context  and  the  conditions  for  using  this 
management device. 
Data  on  the  police  case  study  have  been  gathered  during  the  preparation  and 
administration of training in MCS for police managers. This training allowed us to meet most 
of  the  responsible  parties  in  police  administration  in  charge  of  the  implementation  of 
management control. A lot of managers were also met during the training. This allows us to 
discuss their feelings, their fear, or their hopes for this new change. Some time was passed in 
a police station to understand in more depth the problems encountered by policemen and 
policewomen. Finally, very important and public documentation was gathered on the activity 
and performance of the police. These sources were produced by social scientists, journalists, 
and  politicians  (especially  S￩nat’s  debates).  A  data  triangulation  was  made,  and 
interpretations issued from the field study were discussed with police managers to validate or 
invalidate our conclusions. These interactions allowed us to reduce researcher subjectivity. 
In the case of the environment and control of the Energy Agency (ADEME), various 






































management control system. The following remarks describe the four principal stages of the 
research project by analyzing the participation of the researcher.  
-  During the first stage of the project, the researcher tries to understand the context of the 
management of the organizations (ADEME, APCEDE and local communities). For each 
one,  data  are  collected  on  various  aspects  in  order  to  operate  a  triangulation  of  the 
information (meetings, talks, Internet sites, plates of presentation, etc.). 
-  The second stage made it possible to analyze the management of the activities of the 
waste service of the local communities in Poitou-Charentes and Aquitaine areas. This 
diagnosis is carried out via a questionnaire addressed to 233 structures managing waste. If 
the statistical  studies  describe the situation of  management  of the waste service, they 
especially  confirm  the  interest  the  project  holds  for  the  local  communities.  This 
investigation is supplemented by a technical feasibility study: carried out in collaboration 
with a local community, this study defines the contours of the management control.  
-  To carry out the audit of the local communities, a study of the management control 
device  used  and  needed  for  the  management  of  waste  services  is  carried  out  by  the 
intermediary:  on  the  one  hand,  individual  talks  are  carried  out  in  six  communities 
(directors, technical and financial persons, accountants, and elected officials) and, on the 
other hand, collective meetings  were held to  gather the affected communities. On the 
whole, this stage represents 10 hours of collective meetings and 30 hours of individual 
talks. 
-  To improve the management control device, this last stage of the project results in a series 
of experiments carried out in five local communities of the Poitou-Charentes area 
whose follow-up is carried out via collective meetings. 
  Two case studies 
We will now describe our two case studies in accordance with three dimensions: the 
context  of  the  study,  the  reforms  carried  out,  and  the  consequences  of  the  use  of  new 
management control systems. 
1.3  Implementation of a performance measurement system in the police 
We will first present the general design of the reform and we will show how it can 
impact management activities. Finally, we will rapidly present its implication for the police. 
  A new reform in a long history 
The police are a branch of the French public administration. This branch has had to 
develop or to reinforce a management control system for four years. This development takes 
place in a long series of previous reforms that aimed to implement such a system. In 1960s, 
French  administration  tried  to  implement  RCB  (rationalisation  des  choix  budgétaires),  a 
French version of the American PPBS. Experiments, based on voluntary involvement, were 
stopped  during  the  1980s  despite  few  successes  (Malo).  An  MBO  (management  by 
objectives) was implemented, but without great success. A new trial has taken place in a 
context of national reform of public accountability: the Lolf for ―budget reform and State 
modernization‖ since 2001. Police are subject to the Lolf Reform. To implement the Lolf, the 
police  investigated  the  use  of  BOP  (the  new  budgetary  principles),  cost  calculations, 
indicators and scorecards (balanced if possible). 
This duty was reinforced by the presence of Nicolas Sarkozy, a new minister in office 
from May 2002 to March 2004, who was ―actively‖ engaged in the modernization of the 






































President has seen the strong rise of extreme right party. Its high score could be explained by 
the feeling of insecurity among citizens. The new majority called for a strong Minister for the 
Police  to  reassure  the  French  citizens.  As  soon  as  he  became  minister,  Nicolas  Sarkozy 
launched a process of public ―revitalization‖ for the action of the Police. His aim was to show 
that government takes into account the desires of the French citizens. When he arrived at this 
ministry, one of his first actions was to promote a systematic evaluation of his subordinates in 
terms  of  efficacy.  This  new  mode  of  management  legitimized  the  ―result  culture‖  in  the 
police. This has been reinforced by an offensive political discourse justifying Lolf (budgetary 
constraints, references to the private sector, fear of privatization, defence of public service 
through the display of its performance, etc.) 
In order to develop management control systems (MCS), different stratagems have 
been used. 
-  A private consultancy firm has been hired to manage a vast training program. 
-  Despite permanent comparison with private sector, actors would also like to affirm their 
specificity. This desire to be different has had an impact on the building of MCS devices. 
Actors  preferred  to  build  their  own  devices  even  if  they  reinvented  already  known 
devices. In some cases, they appropriated some words (like Activity-Based Costing, or 
ABC) to explain the design of their cost system, even if it was not ABC. 
-  Finally, the last stratagem used has been the fear of privatization and the defence of public 
service. 
  A global reform of the French administration 
On August 2001, the French parliament enacted a new law on the way to elaborate the 
governmental budget, which was named ―Lolf.‖ This new law is important due to the decision 
which leads to its promulgation. A quasi-consensus was formed, for the first time, by the two 
chambers of the French parliament, to change the way of spending public money. Lolf has to 
be used for the 2006 budget, but a blueprint has been already realized in the 2005 budget. The 
aim of Lolf is officially to introduce a ―result culture‖ instead of a mean culture in the French 
administration to improve how public money is spent. Besides controlling spending, Lolf 
introduced  a  control  on  the  opportunities  for  this  spending  and  the  results  obtained  for 
citizens.  It  affects  several  aspects  of  the  functioning  of  public  administration.  Financial 
accounting and budgetary accounting are modified, but we only focus on the second item. 
Lolf changed the way that the budget of the government is voted for. Budgets will no longer 
be  voted  for  by  nature  of  spending,  but  rather  according  to  the  missions  of  the  public 
administration; i.e., according to the final purpose of public spending. Lolf wants to avoid a 
systematic extension of the previous budget without passing judgement on the results of the 
previous budget. This is why this new way of voting is supposedly applicable to the first euro. 
A framework has  been  elaborated to  implement this  new law.  Instead  of chapters 
(currently 850 chapters) used to allocate the budget, missions of the government are now 
broken down into ―missions – programs – actions – sub actions‖. About 40 missions, 150 
ministerial programs and 500 actions exist. Within a program, the budget can be redistributed 
by managers according to their priorities. This globalization is essentially limited to human 
resource  expenses.  An  ordinary  expense  cannot  be  transformed  to  a  wage,  due  to  the 
impossibility to go back to the previous situation. The budget will be allocated to programs 
through BOP (budget de programme or budget of program). BOP promoters proposed to 
elaborate budget forecasting by taking into account different levels of action. But they also 
proposed to keep expenses in chapters. The final result is, then, a matrix of forecasting. To 
justify their expenses, ministries should produce  a PAP (projet annuel de performance or 
annual performance project) indicating the results they want to achieve. This PAP should be 






































(rapport annuel de performance or annual performance report) to justify the use of budget. 
This RAP should prove that budget has been used in a better way that provides valuable 
services to citizens. Finally, ministries should be able to figure out costs for each ―missions – 
programs – actions‖ set. So to succeed, ministries have to develop a cost accounting system. 
Lolf  is  finally  a  new  way  to  elaborate  a  budget,  a  systematization  of  management  by 
objectives (MBO) and the use of cost calculations techniques. 
But alongside this change, promoters of the Lolf hope for a change in the management 
of  public  administration  itself.  By  cascading  the  framework  in  all  the  public  offices, 
promoters would like to modify ways how decisions are made and resources used. In each 
program, several BOPs could be managed simultaneously and coordinated by the responsible 
parties of a program. Each intermediate responsible party could build his BOP by taking into 
account  the  objectives  of  the  program.  Agents  are  invited  to  analyse  their  performance 
according three types of objectives: 
-  Socio-economic efficacy 
-  Service quality level 
-  Resources efficiency achievement 
Agents  are  invited  to  complete  strategic  objectives  with  intermediary  objectives 
(means used and level of activity) and complementary objectives, to take local challenge into 
account. This reform is particularly interesting for studying the attempt to implement a new 
MBO in public management. 
  From assessment device to learning device 
Several explanations could account for the previous lack of success. First, one could 
wonder if it is possible to develop a management control system in a public administration. 
According to Ouchi’s (1979) analysis, clarity of objectives and knowledge of cause-effect 
relationships seem to be insufficient to make correct use of indicators in the public sector. A 
recent example in a public report of the Parliament gives a good picture of the problem. Police 
and military police recently proposed the same indicator to measure road safety: the percent 
of people with higher blood alcohol content than is allowed by law. But they proposed two 
different readings of the results. According to the police, if this percent increases, that means 
their  performance  increases  because  it  shows  their  ability  to  find  dangerous  people.  But 
according military police, the meaning is exactly reversed because this is a sign of inability to 
make  the  roads  more  secure.  So,  implementing  management  control  asks  for  defining 
precisely the conventions behind figures. Second, previous reforms failed because of the lack 
of incentives to reach objectives. There is a conflict between HR politics and performance 
recognition. Third, management of political staff is not compatible with the search for too-
precise performance measures. Political men and women prefer discretionary choices. Finally, 
the management principles in the administration and the current structure don’t facilitate use 
of  performance  indicators  because  each  good  result  would  be  captured  by  central 
administration, especially if this performance saves money. Despite failures that have not 
been  studied  in  depth  before  the  launch  of  the  actual  change,  a  new  reform  has  been 
developed. Paradoxically, if this  reform  doesn’t  bring  anything new in the assessment of 
performance, it changes behaviours of police staff all the same. Despite wrong or imprecise 
figures, a professionalization of the police staff has occurred.  
Since his arrival, Nicolas Sarkozy decided to call up the departmental managers of 
public security to explain their performance. He has chosen a very simple indicator to select 
the managers to call up: the number of law offences recorded by the police each month. To be 
more  precise,  he  decided  to  call  up  the  five  most  important  increases  and  the  five  most 
important decreases compared to the same month of the previous year. This is derived from 






































reduce crime. This method has not been used yet in France. This new management device 
tries to provide the police with a clear aim: ―Restore the street to citizens.‖ 
The  indicator  chosen  is  very  controversial  because  of  its  lack  of  significance.  It 
indicates the activity of the police rather than their performance. In fact, this indicator is 
higher  when  police  are  in  the  street  doing  their  job  or  when  it  improves  police  offices’ 
facilitation of addressing the public’s complaints. As ironically suggested by the police, the 
best way to decrease this figure should be to suppress the police. But, of course, because you 
don’t  see  delinquency  doesn’t  mean  that  it  doesn’t  exist.  This  figure  doesn’t  measure 
delinquency, but it is very easy for the public to understand. The minister could report on it 
even if this measure is unfair for recording police activity. The minister knew this fact and 
used this figure with more precaution internally than externally. He publicly celebrates the 
fact  that  the  figures  dropped  under  the  symbolic  figure  of  4  million  (but  the  figure  was 
approximately  3,900,000)  in  2003.  But  when  you  know  that  this  recording  of  facts  is 
especially subjective and that the ―grey zone,‖ which is delinquency not known to police but 
known  through  victim  enquiries,  is  about  11  million,  you  realize  the  irrelevance  of  the 
measure.  It’s  very  interesting  to  notice  how  the  ministry  changed  over  time  its  way  of 
managing around this indicator internally. At the end of the period, heads of department could 
be held  accountable for ―bad figures‖ but could receive congratulations for the way they 
monitor  their  activity.  Or,  conversely,  heads  of  departments  could  be  praised  for  ―good 
results‖ but could be unable to explain the figures. But the police staff is now more concerned 
about the necessity of justifying their performance, to choose priority missions or to imagine 
new ways of operation. As a policewoman told us: ―I was quite reluctant to develop such 
devices. The figures I use are still wrong or imprecise but I have to acknowledge they give me 
a new and interesting picture with which to manage missions differently.‖ However, this does 
not have an immediate effect on the final indicators. 
1.4  The Agency and the local communities 
After understanding the context of the case study, we describe the reform and we try to 
understand the consequences of the management control systems for the role of actors in 
public organizations. 
  Cost of the waste service: a public project 
The ADEME is a public organization created in 1992. The purpose of the agency is defined in 
its statutes: Act against air pollution, limit and value waste, prevent pollution of grounds; 
realize energy savings and develop renewable energies, act against noise pollution  (Law no. 
90-1130 of December 19, 1990, item 1st). The creation of this establishment answers to the 
will of the authorities to take up an essential challenge for the 21st century: An economic and 
technological development that is respectful of the environment. To take up this challenge, the 
agency  is  structured  around  26  regional  delegations.  700  collaborators  develop  the  three 
competencies dedicated to this organization: expertise and the council, the creation of new 
knowledge, and its diffusion.  
One of the special axes of development of the agency is related to the management of 
waste activities. The financial management of waste is registered like a major objective: “To 
facilitate the outlets of recycling and thus reduce the invoice „waste‟ of the taxpayers/users, 
[the ADEME] researches the reduction of the costs at all the stages.” This will is due to the 
difficulties  encountered  by  local  communities  in  the  implementation  of  processes  of 
management able to provide reliable information on the activities of the waste service. During 
1990, “the modernization of the management of waste generates an important and ignored 






































communities. Indeed, “the consolidation of this modernization rests on the improvement of 
the capacities of the communities to manage this service. To achieve this goal, the local 
communities must develop a management cost accounting” (Begnaud, 2000). Thus, the future 
development of the waste service of the local communities is founded on the consolidation of 
their capacities of management. In front of this situation, and in accordance with its missions, 
the agency brings a solution to  the local  communities  with  a new project: to  establish  a 
management control system. The purpose of this project is to modernize the waste services, 
while  controlling  the  costs  related  to  their  evolutions.  The  agency  defines  its  objectives 
precisely: “to create a method of management costs for the waste services starting from the 
charts of accounts M 4, M 14.‖ 
In synthesis, the agency want to parameterize and introduce a management control 
system into the local communities to create an internal dynamic (F. Busson-Villa, 2000) and 
to allow the adaptation of the public utility to the recent needs of the sector (R. Demeestere, 
2002, 57-58) and, on the other hand, to contribute to the development of its missions while 
trying to ascertain and compare the cost of the waste service. 
  How to introduce a management control systems?  
The analysis of the project makes it possible to analyze specifics of the construction of 
a management control system in public organizations.  
At the beginning, the management control system is not created and the network of 
organizations is not yet made up. However, in spite of the absence of the organizations, the 
actors present at the beginning of the process reveal their position. The discussions indicate 
the influence of the members of the agency: they wish to develop a costs device to control the 
local  communities.  During  these  debates,  the  role  of  the  organization  is  perceptible.  The 
representations of the management control systems depend on the organisational context in 
which  the  actors  evolve.  For  example,  the  organisational  difficulties  perceived  by  the 
members of the ADEME justify their engagement and the objectives  of the management 
control  device:  “the  ADEME  has  difficulties  with  the  costs  of  waste.  The  objective  is  to 
develop  a  cost  which  makes  it  possible  to  distribute  homogeneous  results.”  So,  the 
management control system considered is related only to their representations.  
Gradually, the management control systems changes. From an idea, it arrives to a first 
concretization: a cost management control system. 
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-  they decide the community in which the feasibility study is undertaken and introduce a 
trainee in the creation of the management control device; 
-  however, confrontations with the actors of the communities are very few, and finally the 
management  control  system  is  built  according  to  the  interests  of  the  members  of  the 
agency.  
However, the creation of this management control system does not generate direct 
consequences for the local community lending into the study. It takes part in the construction 
of  the  management  control  system,  but  does  not  know  the  organisational  repercussions. 
Indeed, the agency decides not to use this management control device in the local community. 
Thus, in spite of the creation of the management control systems and the participation of the 
local community in the project, the project is still unchanged. The result of this phase is the 
influence  of  the  members  of  the  agency  on  the  process  of  construction:  they  decide  the 
community to test and decide the form of the management control system. This result is 
explained by a still strong centralization of the project and by a lack of exchanges with the 
various actors of the communities.  
  The management control systems: a link between organization and their 
actors  
From a traditional cost management control device, it moves towards an ABC device. 
How can one explain this evolution?  In the first time, this evolution can be perceived as a 
technical response. Indeed, with the first developments of the management control device, the 
members of the ADEME encounter technical difficulties (for example, how to distribute the 
amount of the indirect charges in the various principal services). In order to address these 
difficulties but also to preserve a true vision of the service activities, they decide to transform 
the  management  control  systems.  Concretely,  the  distinction  between  direct  and  indirect 
charges is erased and the concept of activity replaces the concept of service (Lebas 1991). 
This reflection leads to identification of the activities constituting the waste service (Mevellec 
1992). Moreover, the cost is defined by activity, but also, by the type of waste. The second 
time, this change is carried out at the same time as the decision to create a network around the 
project. This proximity with the local communities is concretized by the creation and the 
animation of a network of organizations. By integrating more and more communities and their 
members,  the  agency  encourages  the  members  of  the  communities  to  actively  begin  the 
project: “The objective would be to create areas of exchange and to look further into realities 
of management of the communities.” At this stage, a ―project team‖ is created. It takes the 
form of a network of organizations in which various actors can swap. However, these actors 
insist  on  developing  a  management  control  systems  that  generate  the  monitoring  of  the 
service. Thus, these new representations will operate on the management control system, but 
also on the representations of the agency actors. Gradually, common representations emerge 
and the members of the project team agree on the ABC device (table no. 2). The requests of 
the  communities  make  the  project  evolve,  and  these  organizations  take  part  in  the 



























































At the end of the construction process, the project team changes. It restricts itself to 
the actors of the agency and technical persons in charge for the waste service. This new 
structure creates a new space for discussion. The various actors of the project try to act on the 
creation of the procedures. The conventions used at this stage reveal the learning necessary to 
the construction of management control systems. The objective is to determine consensus. 
Moreover, during this stage, the organization of the local communities changes in order to 
utilize the management control systems. Indeed, the communities will create their structure by 
creating meetings between various services or by developing new procedures on which the 
management control device can be based. These observations confirm the influence of the 
management control system on the organization of the local communities.  
Finally, the growing influence of the actors of the communities reveals the connection 
linking  the  organization  and  the  management  control  system:  the  experiments  have 
consequences for the management control systems, but also for the organizations. 
  Discussion 
In  both  cases,  management  control  implementation  asks  serious  questions.  By 
answering these questions, we can better understand the functioning of these systems. For 
example, one of these questions is the possibility of implementing MCS in public sector: 
“Perhaps the most fundamental question is whether private sector notions of performance 
measurement and accountability are applicable in the public sector” (Ittner and Larker, 1998, 
233).  It  seems  that  too  much  emphasis  has  been  put  on  performance  assessment,  to  the 
detriment  of  any  other  functions  or  roles  of  management  control  as  learning,  consensus-
setting or changing devices as underlined by Modell (2004, 45-46). Performance in the public 
sector is very ambiguous and difficult to assess. Too many stakeholders are involved. But by 
promoting  dialogue  (and  sometimes  by  closing  this  dialogue),  MCS  may  help  to  discuss 
performance and activities that never would have been questioned otherwise. 
It is clear enough that implementation upsets organizations, because it reconfigures 
power networks inside organizations. Management control systems are not only ceremonial 
devices used to legitimate public actions, but they also allow management of performance in 
unexpected ways, and change ways of doing activity. A de-coupling takes place between 
displayed functions and the latent functions of these devices and forces reassessment of the 
performance criteria for such devices. 
-  Displayed functions refer to the desire to assess performance to legitimize public activity. 






































seems  to  function  as  a  myth.  Since  MCS  is  not  an  answer  machine,  it  becomes  a 
rationalization machine (Burchell et al., 1980). 
-  Latent  functions  could  not  be  expressed  clearly  because  they  change  the  power  of 
stakeholders. MCS is thus used as a way to display constraints, outcomes and discretion 
behaviours. MCS is an ammunition machine or a learning machine (Burchell et al., 1980). 
It clearly appears in both cases that management control systems are used by managers 
to  display  their  will  to  take  efficiency  concerns  into  account.  This  display  seems  to  be 
prevalent despite some actors who use these devices to promote their own career through their 
high-legitimacy  activity.  Some  people  even  claim  that  their  job  consists  of  ―managing 
figures,‖ thus indicating they want to convince others of their performance rather than to 
improve situations. All these performance measurements sometimes seem to be far from the 
real activity of actors, and they thus can be analysed as rational myths. But could we really 
only link management control devices developed by public organizations to rational myth? 
The answer is not clear when we closely examine our case studies. In part, it seems that new 
systems implemented run as rational myths justifying an organization’s existence rather than 
improving their efficiency. But this explanation does not suffice. 
Management control devices can be used as a rational myth, especially for reassuring 
outside  partners.  They  allow  managers  to  communicate  to  the  stakeholders  about  public 
activities. For the police, they show citizens that security is under control. Some actors use 
these devices to communicate better. Thus, Minister Sarkozy has largely publicized his will to 
implement  a  result  culture.  For  ADEME,  creation  of  a  new  management  control  system 
allows it to have relevant figures on waste management.  
But management control devices can be reduced to this first use. They also can be 
mobilized internally to allow public organizations to improve their efficiency. It influences 
organization members to rethink their activity. In the police case, performance improvement 
seems  to  have  been  a  side  effect  of  the  rational  myth.  However,  the  durability  of  this 
performance  is  not  certain.  Despite  the  difficulties  encountered  in  implementation,  some 
actors appreciate a system that allows a better understanding of complex activity. Thus, these 
devices  also  have  a colonisation effect  (Power, 1997). The  result of management  control 
device implementation in the police could be different than what was  forecasted. Once a 
device used to measure performance, it is now a tool to change organizational culture. The 
interesting  point  is  that  the  same  design  of  the  system  has  a  different  result  than  was 
forecasted. Criteria for its success should be revised. In ADEME case, local communities use 
the devices in an unpredictable manner. Managers adapt it to their own needs with the aim to 
better monitor activities. Despite that this device is still in progress, it could be interesting to 
study how it is used. 
Thus, despite clearly ceremonial dimensions, systems seem run and have effects on the 
way activities are run. They are not only a ceremonial myth. We also see that these systems 
have to be adapted to public activity. Their influence is not negligible even if they don’t fit 
with  what  was  expected.  This  makes  assessment  of  implementation  difficult.  Problems 
addressed  by  management  control  devices  move  from  assessment  of  performance  to 
management of change. Systems seem to run as a de-coupled system (Fernandez-Revuelta 
and Robson, 1999):  
-  Organizations display a way of doing which doesn’t fit with actual practices in use after 
reform. This communicated practice is clearly a ceremonial one for searching for more 
legitimacy.  This  legitimacy  fits  with  the  legitimacy  used  to  implement  management 
control devices. Thus, management control devices are imposed through legitimacy, but 
they also produce legitimacy. 
-  Internally, actors use devices in a way previously unforeseen. Management tools do not 






































thus break routines. Side effects appear from these new ways of action and take the place 
of previous, older side effects. 
This  analysis  seems  to  explain  the  failure  observed  during  the  implementation  of 
private sector management control devices in the public sector. Management control has to be 
adapted to the context of these organizations. A decoupling between displayed and latent 
functions appears and creates specificities for management public devices. 
Conclusion 
Assessment of management control devices in public organizations is a very difficult 
task.  We  have  to  sort  out  the  ceremonial  impact  of  theses  tools  from  their  real  effects, 
predictable results from unforeseen results, and results already obtained in the private sector 
from those obtained in the public sector after adaptation of these tools. 
As our both case studies show us, the implementation is sustained by a process of 
legitimacy  that  uses  the  full  scope  of  isomorphism.  The  results  obtained  are  partially 
ceremonial and partially real, but with unpredictable effects. A sort of decoupling can be 
observed. So, we cannot conclude that management control systems are not well used by 
public organizations. It seems the public organizations have to create and use management 
control systems to answer to the complexity of their environment. These devices will be used 
by many actors in public organizations (officials, technicians, financial personnel, etc.). This 
research does not explain the question of the content of the management control systems. We 
understand that the aim of the management control devices used by private organizations is 
different in public organizations because of the level of general interest. However, we can 
discuss the form of management control systems in public organizations. Instead of using the 
management  control  system  created  by  private  organizations,  should  public  organizations 
invent their own management control systems? 
Bibliography 
Aucoin P. (1995), ―The New Public Management: Canada in comparative perspective‖, Institute fort Research 
on Public Policy. 
Audria R. (2004), « New Public Management et Transparence: essai de déconstruction d'un mythe actuel », 
Th￨se pr￩sent￩e à la Facult￩ des sciences ￩conomiques et sociales de l’Universit￩ de Gen￨ve. 
Barberis P. (1998), ―The New Public Management and a New Accountability‖, Public Administration, volume 
76, p. 451-470. 
Boyne A. G. (2002), ―Public and Private Management: What’s the Difference?‖ Journal of Management Studies, 
n°39, n°1, Janvier, p. 97-122. 
Burchell S., Clubb C., Hopwood A., Hughes J. and Nahapiet J. (1980), ―The roles of accounting in organizations 
and society‖, Accounting, Organizations and Society 5(1): 5-27. 
Carpenter V.L. and E.H. Feroz. (2001), Institutional theory and accounting rule choice: an analysis of four US 
state governments’ d￩cisions to adopt generally accepted accounting principles, Accounting, organizations 
and society, 26, 565-596. 
Dawson D. and C. Dargie . (1999), ―New Public Management. An Assessment and Evaluation with Reference to 
UK Health‖, Public Management, Volume 1, n°4, p. 459-481. 
Demeestère R. (2002), Le contrôle de gestion dans le secteur public, LGDJ, Coll. Systèmes Finances Publiques. 
DiMaggio P.J. and W.W. Powell (1983), ―The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective 
rationality in organizational fields‖, American sociological review, Vol. 48 April, pp. 147-160. 
Emery Y. et D. Giauque (2004), Paradoxe de la gestion publique, Editions L’Harmattan,  
Ferlie  E.  and  P.  Steane.  (2002),  ―Changing  Developments  in  NPM‖,  International  Journal  of  Public 
Administration, volume 25, n°12, p. 1459-1469. 
Fernandez-Revuelta Perez, L. and K. Robson. (1999). "Ritual legitimation, de-coupling and the budgetary 
process: managing organizational hypocrisies in a multinational company". Management Accounting 






































Finger M, and B. Ruchat (1997), Pour une nouvelle approche du management public. Réflexions autour de 
Michel Crozier, Séli Arslan. 
Glor D. E. (2001), ―Has Canada Adopted the New Public Management ?‖, Public Management Review, volume 
3, n°1, p. 121-130. 
Haque S. (2000) ﾫ Importance de l’imputabilit￩ dans la nouvelle approche de la gouvernance publique ﾻ, in 
Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives, vol. 66. 
Hood C. (1991), ―A Public Management for all Season‖, Public Administration, volume 69, n°1, p. 13-19. 
Ittner  C.D.  and  D.F.  Larker  (1998),  ―Innovations  in  performance  measurement:  Trends  and  Research 
Implications‖, Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 10, 205-238. 
Kaplan, Robert S. and Norton, David P. (1992) ―The Balanced Scorecard - Measures That Drive Performance‖ 
Harvard Business Review. 1992; p. 71-79. 
Levant Y. and O. De La Villarmois (2001), « Origine et d￩veloppement d’une m￩thode de calcul des coûts: la 
méthode des unités de valeur ajoutée (UVA) », Comptabilité Contrôle Audit, novembre. 
Loeffler E. (1997), The Modernization of the Public Sector in a International Comparative Perspective, Speyer. 
Merriem  F-X.  (1999),  « La  nouvelle  gestion  publique:  un  concept  mythique »,  Lien  Social  et  Politiques, 
printemps, p. 95-103. 
Meyer J.W. and B. Rowan (1977), ―Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony‖, 
American Journal of Sociology, vol.83, n°2, September, pp. 340-363.  
Modell  S.  (2004),  ―Performance  Measurement  Myths  in  the  Public  Sector:  a  Research  Note‖,  Financial 
Accountability & Management, 20 (1), 39-54. 
Monks  J.  (1998),  La  nouvelle  gestion  publique:  boîte  à  outil  ou  changement  de  paradigme ?  In  La  pensée 
comptable, sous la direction de M. Hufty, PUF, p. 77-90. 
Mulgan R. (2000), ―Comparing Accountability in the Public and Private Sectors‖, Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, Vol. 59, mars. 
OCDE (2003), La modernisation du secteur public 
Ouchi, W. (1979), "A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control mechanisms". Management 
Science, 25,9, p.833-848. 
Pollitt C. (1993), Managerialism and the public services, Oxford, UK, Blackwell. 
Pollitt C. (1995), ―Management Techniques for the Public Sector: Pulpit and Practice”, Centre for Management 
Development. 
Power, M. (1997), The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford University Press. 
Riccuci M. N. (2001), ―The ﾫ Old » Public Management Versus the « New » Public Management: Where Does 
Public Administration Fit In ? ―, Public Administration Review, volume 61, n°2, p 172-175. 
Saint-Germain  M.  (2001),  « Une  cons￩quence  de  la  nouvelle  gestion  publique:  l’￩mergence  d’une  pens￩e 
comptable en éducation », Education et Francophonie, Volume 29, n°2.  
Scott W.R. (1995), Institutions and Organizations, Sage. 
Singh A. (2003), ―Questioning the New Public Management‖, Public Administration Review, volume 63, n°1, p. 
116-119. 
Snyder W. and E. Wenger (2000), « Cultiver vos réseaux invisibles », L‟Expansion Management Review, n°96, 
mars, p ; 6-12. 
Terry  L.  (1998),  ―Administrative  Leadership,  Neo-managerialism,  and  the  Public  Management  Movement‖, 
Public Administration Review, p. 194-200. 
Urio P. (1998), « La gestion publique au service du marché », In La pensée comptable, sous la direction de M. 
Hufty, PUF, p. 91-124. 
h
a
l
-
0
0
3
4
0
4
3
2
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
1
6
 
A
p
r
 
2
0
1
0